Zero Trust for government
I design identity-centric security architectures that reduce implicit trust, strengthen control boundaries, and keep government and regulated environments defensible under continuous pressure.
What you get
- Trust-domain model for classified and unclassified estates
- Cross-agency identity federation design
- Cross-domain exchange rules and gateways
- PAM for remote, satellite and field sites
- Policy-as-code guardrails for hybrid cloud
- Accreditation and audit-evidence pack
Applied at: NATO / NCIA · EEAS · UN System · Romanian MIA · PIR2-IT
Institutional foundation
Zero Trust is not a product. It is an operating model for security, architecture, and governance—built around verification, segmentation, least privilege, and continuous control of access and behavior.
Zero Trust experience across institutional environments
Representative patterns include identity-centric access design, segmentation for high-trust systems, privileged-access governance, continuous monitoring, and evidence-led security controls aligned with operational reality.
What I Do
Core capabilities: Zero Trust architecture, IAM/PAM alignment, segmentation, continuous verification, control evidence, and secure operating models for complex institutions. Mission context: government, defense, critical infrastructure, banking, and regulated digital environments. Outcome: security becomes enforceable, measurable, and resilient under audit and operational stress.
Principles
- Verify explicitly and continuously
- Limit privileges to operational necessity
- Segment trust zones and critical assets
- Monitor behavior, access, and anomalies continuously
- Retain evidence for review, assurance, and response
Why it matters
Government environments cannot rely on perimeter-era assumptions. Zero Trust matters because institutional resilience now depends on identity, control, segmentation, and continuous evidence—not implied trust.
Impact in numbers
Figures as recorded on named engagements — each one is listed on the Projects page.
How it works in government and defence
- Classify trust domains. Classified, unclassified, coalition and partner networks treated as separate domains with explicit crossing rules.
- Federate identity across agencies. One identity per person across ministries and contractors, so access can be granted and revoked once.
- Govern cross-domain exchange. mTLS, message-level signing and logged approvals for every flow between domains.
- Extend control to remote sites. Privileged access over satellite and field links handled with the same policy as headquarters.
- Policy as code in cloud adoption. Hybrid-cloud boundaries defined and enforced in code, not in slide decks.
- Evidence for accreditation. Security accreditation and audit evidence produced as part of delivery, not assembled afterwards.
Where it was applied
- NATO / NCIA · 2023 – 2024CS-NDW governance framework, cloud adoption and DevSecOps in a classified NATO environment; integration backbone and IAM across classified and unclassified domains.
- EEAS · 2022 – 2023Secure multi-domain (classified / unclassified) network and C4 architecture using NAF and Federated Mission Networking concepts; EU Space and satellite security architecture.
- UN HQ / OICT · 2016 – 2019United ID inter-agency harmonisation — common ICT security approaches and standards for the UN System.
- IBM · 2008 – 2011National cyber security for the Romanian Ministry of Internal Affairs — unified incident response across 250 offices.
- PIR2-IT · 2024 – PresentOpen-source government interoperability platform: Zero Trust, mTLS, verifiable credentials and policy-as-code, post-quantum ready by design.
Where programmes usually go wrong
- Running classified and unclassified estates as one programme with one risk owner.
- Identity silos per ministry — a contractor removed in one place keeps access in five others.
- Perimeter assumptions for embassies, delegations and field sites on satellite links.
- Accreditation evidence assembled after go-live, delaying operation by months.
- Sovereign key material and logs held outside national control.
Questions worth asking before you fund it
- Who authorises each cross-domain flow, and is every approval logged?
- Can one decision revoke a contractor across all ministries and systems?
- Where do the keys live — in-country HSMs under government control?
- What still works when the satellite uplink or the cloud region is lost?
C2 · C3 · C4ISR · C5I programmes
Command, control, communications and intelligence architecture — from the Alcatel and IBM Centres of Excellence to maritime surveillance C2 and EU multi-domain networks.
- Alcatel · 2002 – 2006Co-led the Alcatel Centre of Excellence for Defence, Security and Intelligence — cryptography, C2 and C4ISR architectures; Border Protection integrated system and Black Sea / Danube surveillance.
- IBM EMEA CoE · 2008 – 2011Direct support of national and multinational C2, C3 and C5 activities; critical military systems across 28+ upgrade and migration projects; 146 military and civilian organisations, including 36 Centres of Excellence.
- Romanian MoD · 2008SCOMAR v1 — Black Sea maritime-surveillance C2: multi-sensor integration, secure communications and multi-agency data exchange.
- Romanian MoD / Border Police · 2020SCOMAR v2 — C2 modernisation with interoperability to legacy sensors and high-availability secure communications.
- EEAS · 2022 – 2023Secure multi-domain network and C4 architecture (NAF, Federated Mission Networking). EEAS C3 — cyberspace requirements and architecture: Classified.
- U.S. DoD · 2019 – 2022JEDI / JWCC / JADC2 — Classified.
- PIR2-IT · 2024 – PresentGoverned autonomous systems and radar + camera sensor-fusion demonstrators for regulated mission environments.
Standards: NAF, Federated Mission Networking, AQAP-2110 / STANAG 4107, STANAG 4586 / 4609 / 4559, STANAG 5516 / 5066.
Defence & intelligence →