Cybersecurity Risk

Cybersecurity & risk

Risk-based cybersecurity governance and secure architecture for regulated, mission-critical environments.

Available for senior advisory
NATO Secret · active 25+ years · 270+ projects 📍 Bucharest · Europe · Global
270+projects delivered76 of them mission-critical
59countriesadvisory and delivery footprint
US$110Mlargest single programmebudget range US$100K – US$110M
25+years1996 → present · 15 institutions
Cybersecurity, compliance & riskControls · evidence · defensibility

Cybersecurity, compliance & risk

Cybersecurity governance in high-trust environments depends on evidence-led control design, defensible assurance, and alignment between security architecture, operations, and oversight.

Representative KPI signals

15+Security and governance frameworks implemented
Multi-domainIAM / PAM integration patterns
Zero-trustSegmentation patterns for regulated environments
ImprovedAudit defensibility through evidenced controls

Positioning

This domain demonstrates how control evidence, architecture discipline, and audit readiness strengthen institutional resilience in complex environments.

Representative scope

  • Policy-to-control alignment and governance traceability
  • IAM, PAM, segmentation and access governance
  • Risk, compliance and assurance coordination
  • Security support for digital transformation and mission-critical services

Operational signals

  • Security frameworks aligned with complex institutional constraints
  • Identity-centric control patterns across multiple trust zones
  • Risk visibility supported by decision records and evidence packs
  • Cross-domain governance that strengthens audit and review readiness

Typical deliverables

  • Security governance frameworks and control matrices
  • IAM / PAM integration patterns and assurance views
  • Audit support packs and evidence-led control documentation
  • Risk dashboards, review packs and compliance briefings

Sector applicability

  • Defence and security contexts
  • International organizations
  • Regulated industries
  • Cloud and hybrid infrastructure programs

Impact in numbers

Figures as recorded on named engagements — each one is listed on the Projects page.

100%
audit compliance — cyber-security audit of DCS, SCADA, PLC and RTU per NRC, NEI and NISTCernavoda Nuclear Power Plant · 2013 – 2015
89%
of 120+ audit recommendations closed; multi-tier security across 300 servers and 350+ applicationsBRD — Groupe Société Générale · 2011 – 2013
−35%
ISO 27001 / PCI DSS / GDPR / SOC 2 audit findings within one yearUN HQ / OICT · 2016 – 2019
up to −58%
MTTR across Palo Alto, CyberArk, CrowdStrike, DLP and SIEM platformsPIR2-IT · 2024 – Present

How I approach it

  • Tie risk to services. A risk register built on business services and critical assets, each with a named owner.
  • Map obligations once. ISO 27001, NIST 800-53, PCI DSS, GDPR, DORA and NIS2 mapped to one control set.
  • Engineer the controls. Architecture changes, not policy documents alone.
  • Detect and respond. SIEM / SOAR playbooks and a cyber-crisis process exercised with executives.
  • Keep evidence current. Evidence packs refreshed continuously, so audits stop being projects.
  • Report in board language. Risk appetite, key risk indicators and trend — not tool counts.

Where it was applied

  • Groupe Société Générale · 2013 – 2015Cernavoda NPP — cyber-security audit and service-management restructuring; 100% audit compliance.
  • BRD — Groupe Société Générale · 2011 – 2013Cyber-security architecture and audit remediation; business-continuity plan; +27% data-centre efficiency.
  • Innovation Center · 2019 – 2022IT audits and security assessments for banks and multinationals; Cyber Crisis Management programme; CyberPro AI security platform.
  • IBM · 2008 – 2011National cyber security for the Romanian Ministry of Internal Affairs (ISO 2700x, NIST).
  • UN HQ / OICT · 2016 – 2019Zero Trust and awareness programme — −35% audit findings in one year.
All engagements on Projects →

Where programmes usually go wrong

  • Compliance managed in spreadsheets, disconnected from the architecture.
  • Findings closed on paper while the weakness stays in production.
  • Crisis plans written but never rehearsed with the people who decide.
  • Third-party and supplier risk outside the risk register.
  • Security reported as tools deployed rather than risk reduced.

Questions worth asking before you fund it

  • Which five risks would stop a critical service, and who owns each one?
  • How old is the oldest open audit finding?
  • When did executives last take part in a cyber-crisis exercise?
  • Can you produce evidence for any key control within 24 hours?

Next step

Decisions that survive audit start with a clear brief.

Architecture authority, governance design and programme oversight for institutions where failure is not an option. Evidence for every role and project is available on request.